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Doctrine corner: U.S. Army Intelligence Center and school requirements for lessons learnedClyde Green
Recognizing the need to incorporate lessons learned, at all echelons, regarding all functions (e.g., processes, equipment functionality, procedures, etc.), below are some of the general themes and specific requirements for collecting lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). These themes and requirements will be used by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) subject matter expert (SME) supporting the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) as a guide to facilitate collection of initial intelligence lessons learned during OIF. These lessons learned will be used to--
* Validate current doctrine and assist in the development of emerging and/or new doctrine.
* Validate current systems and assist in the upgrade of those systems.
* Assist in the development of future individual and collective training.
The following are general and specific doctrinal requirements developed
by Doctrine Division, USAIC, to assist in the collection of lessons
learned during OIF.
DOCTRINE If organizations and users could change 1
or 2 things in doctrine, what would
those be?
JOINT INTELLIGENCE 1. How effective was the lash-up to
OPERATIONS AND Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC)?
INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE, AND 2. Were Army requirements and Joint Forces
RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) Land Component Commander and Staff (JFLCC)
INTEGRATION requirements adequately pre-addressed
(conflict and during combat operations)?
REACH OPERATIONS 1. Were reach operations conducted at all
echelons (i.e., specifically at the
lowest echelon)?
2. How was connectivity established and
maintained?
3. How useful was reach (i.e., was it
timely, accurate, and what was the
quality of the information obtained)?
4. What type of intelligence and/or
information was provided?
5. Was it from the Information Dominance
Center (IDC) or Home Station Operations
Center?
6. What type of Intelligence and/or
information was provided by the IDC?
7. Is the 513th MI Brigade (Bde)
(supporting U.S. Army Central Forces
Command [(ARCENT]) actually testing the
Home Station operational concept? If so,
what were the procedures? How well did
it work?
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 1. How were affects and effects assessed?
TO INFORMATION
OPERATIONS (IO) 2. What were the Intelligence procedures
for support to IO?
3. How did the various Division and Corps
Analysis Control Elements (ACEs) divide
their analytical efforts (e.g., close,
deep, rear, threat battlefield operating
system (BOS), decisive, shaping, and
sustaining)?
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE [] Comments and observations
(HUMINT) AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)
OPERATIONS
PROPHET Did divisions use PROPHET? If so, how
often, when, and how was PROPHET employed
during extended road marches, movement to
contact, and combat operations?
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT [] Comments and observations
TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES (SOF), INCLUDING
PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS (PSYOP) AND
CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA)
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT [] Comments and observations
TO TARGETING,
INCLUDING--
[] SOF
[] FIELD ARTILLERY (FA)
[] JOINT AIR UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)
OPERATIONS
[] BATTLE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT (BDA)
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT [] Comments and observations
TO FORCE PROTECTION (FP)
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO 1. Was IPB automated?
URBAN OPERATIONS,
INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE 2. Collection and analysis--strengths and
PREPARATION OF THE weaknesses noted?
BATTLEFIELD (IPB)
ANALYSIS
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO [] Were stability operations and support
STABILITY OPERATIONS operations requirements integrated
AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS at times when units were engaged in combat
operations? If so, how were the
requirements integrated?
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE 1. Was the Intelligence Estimate
OPERATIONS AND continuous?
THE INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE (WITH EMPHASIS 2. Was the Intelligence Estimate
ON PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS) automated?
3. Was the Intelligence Estimate
implemented as an Intelligence Running
Estimate?
4. What products were most useful?
5. How did intelligence elements support
each command post element (echelons)?
The following questions were developed by New Systems Training and
Integration Office (NSTIO) to assist in the collection and performance
of deployed Military Intelligence (MI) systems:
GENERAL QUESTIONS 1. What tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) needed improvement to
better meet mission requirements?
2. Were there significant shortfalls in
Institutional training?
3. Are there any changes recommended for
military occupational specialty (MOS) or
officer courses?
GROUND SYSTEMS 1. How did Prophet maneuver with the
Brigades in 3d Infantry Division (ID),
and was it effective? Was it utilized in
a direct or general support role?
2. Where was the Prophet Control systems
emplaced and did the communications
function correctly? What were the average
communications ranges between Prophet
and Prophet Control?
3. What types of targets was Prophet
unsuccessful against?
4. Could Prophet and Prophet Control keep
pace with the battle?
5. Was crew size for Prophet and Prophet
Control adequate?
6. How were Prophet and Prophet Control
incorporated in the maneuver of 101st
ID (Air Assault)?
7. How was Prophet employed in urban
operations?
8. What were the system failures?
9. What did Prophet and Prophet Control
do well?
10. How often were 98G's able to utilize
their language skills? What percentage
of intercepted communications were
enciphered/encrypted or frequency hopping
vice plain text?
11. How well did leadership understand
capabilities and limitations of the
Prophet? What were the primary
misconceptions? What was the impact of
the Prophet on providing support to
intelligence operations and/or targeting?
COMMON GROUND 1. What was the most useful portion of
STATION (CGS) the CGS NET they received? Explain how
it helped them perform their missions?
2. What is the one thing or area units
and/or individuals could have most used
training on (regarding CGS NET) prior to
their deployment that would have most
benefited them in the area of
responsibility (AOR)?
3. What works as advertised and what did
not? What work-arounds were employed for
problems and how were they implemented?
Were there any hardware/software problems
that severely or moderately impacted
operations?
4. Were on-the-move operations used with
the CGS? Was satellite communication
(SATCOM) reliable for providing a moving
update of the "now" battlefield picture?
Were there problems with generator power
while hauling? Are there concerns,
incidents, or suggestions regarding lack
of ability to ground generator under
these conditions?
5. What interfaces were used most
frequently? At each level (i.e., Brigade,
Division, etc)? What were they tasked for?
At what level? How effective were they?
What types of data were shared and/or
transmitted? How were they connected to
the CGS (hardwire, digital via Single
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
[SINCGARS], SATCOM, ultra-high frequency,
etc.]?
6. How well did signals intelligence
(SIGINT) work? Did any particular IBS work
better than the others?
7. Was all required Crypto/Communications
Security (COMSEC) material available on a
timely basis? If not, why not?
8. Did you have adequate standing
operating procedures (SOPs) prior to
deployment? Can we have a copy for use
and reference?
9. How well did leadership understand
capabilities and limitations of the CGS?
What were the primary misconceptions?
What was the impact of the CGS on
providing support to intelligence
operations and/or targeting?
10. How was the CGS used when Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) flights were not available?
11. Are there any special maintenance
requirements needed to keep the CGS
operational?
ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS 1. How is the interoperability?
SYSTEM (ASAS)-REMOTE (Are they talking to each other?)
WORK STATION (RWS)
2. Is the system locking up often?
3. Are they using the system for IPB/
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)?
4. Are they still using markers, maps,
and overlays?
5. Are the systems able to handle the
message loads?
6. Is the sand wreaking havoc on the
systems?
7. What ASAS-RWS related TTPs have they
been developed? Refined?
8. Who are the boxes talking to?
9. What are their mission threads?
10. What are their workarounds if
something is not working?
11. Are their communications up?
12. How often are they sending
information?
13. What type of maintenance are they
performing?
14. What version and type of ASAS is
being used?
15. How is the joint communication
package working?
16. What units are using the ASAS-RWS?
ASAS-Light (ASAS-L)? ASAS-All Source
(ASAS-AS)? ASAS-Single Source (ASAS-SS)?
NATIONAL/ TACTICAL 1. Was the user training given by Northrop
EXPLOITATION Grumman upon issue to the unit sufficient
SYSTEM (TES) to allow operators to effectively employ
the system on their own after training?
2. Were service and support contracts
given to contractors based on projected
system down time and mean time between
faults? This in turn influences the number
of maintenance personnel and slots
allowed in the unit. Has the system
performed to the standards set forth in
the Operational Requirements Document
and its supporting maintenance contract?
3. Due to budgetary constraints facing all
systems many contractors have been
cutting back their level of Field Service
Representatives (FSRs) support. Have
units experienced degradation in number
of FSRs or availability of FSRs and, if
so, how has units worked around this
issue?
4. How has your unit worked the issue of
support for deployed portions of the
system? (Usually there are a specified
number of FSRs at a given location; with
portions of the systems possibly deployed,
the question arises as to how the
contractor will support split-based
operations).
AVIATION 1. How was the Hunter UAV integrated
with ASAS, Advanced Field Artillery
Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and JSTARS?
2. How were the Remote Viewing Terminals
(RVTs) utilized? Who primarily used them?
3. Were the UAV units able to keep pace
with the units they were supporting?
4. What were the greatest challenges for
UAV units? For example: Selecting
suitable launch and recovery sites?
Maintenance? Security? COMSEC?
5. What effects did the desert
environment have on the deployment and/or
operations?
6. Were the system and its capabilities
and weaknesses well understood by the
battle captain and therefore utilized to
their fullest potential?
7. Primarily what missions were the Hunter
and Shadow utilized for? For example:
Urban terrain? Searching for high-value
targets (HVTs)? Targeting? Air defense
pacification?
8. What challenges did the unit have with
airspace coordination or getting on the
Air Tasking Order? (ATO) or Air Combat
Order (ACO)? Did the UAV use blanket
altitudes or Restricted Operation Zones
(ROZs)?
9. What challenges did the unit have
with frequency management?
10. What lessons were learned in
reference to coordination between the UAV
units and the Tactical Operations Centers
(TOCs)?
11. List 5 things that worked well and
5 things that need improvement in UAV
operations and/or training.
12. What improvement is needed in current
training to support future operations?
For example: Payload operation? Target
recognition? Command, communications,
control, intelligence messaging? Crew
coordination? Airspace management?
Artillery adjustment, etc?
13. Were the UAVs following a mission
profile or were they primarily re-tasked?
If they were re-tasked was there a
problem with airspace coordination and
how was that resolved?
14. What was the primary role of the
350U?
15. What Identify Friend/Foe (IFF)
challenges did the operators/planners
encounter?
16. What problems did the UAV units have
with supply of UAV specific parts and
fuel (MOGAS)?
The following questions were developed to assist in the collection
facts about the performance of MI systems and the effectiveness of
individual and collective training of deployed personnel:
WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS
OF DENIAL AND DECEPTION
ON ENEMY FORCES?
WAS INSTITUTIONAL [] Are there additional tasks that were
TRAINING FOR 96DS, 350DS required that had not been institutionally
ADEQUATE FOR THE TASKS trained?
THAT WERE REQUIRED
DURING OIF? [] Were additional training requirements
identified prior to deployment?
[] What were they?
[] What training materials were required?
[] Were they available?
Could use same question
for all MI MOSs
SIGINT ISSUES 1. Were there enough outside continental
United States (OCONUS) frequencies for
all the MI systems to operate without
interference (e.g., UAV, TROJAN,
Guardrail, etc.)?
NOTE: This is for both the data links
and for the rebroadcast to the information
to the troops (sensor- to-shooter).
2. If there were problems with
frequencies management? What actions were
taken to correct them? How can we prevent
this from happening in the future?
3. Was cross-cueing utilized to verify
Intelligence? If so, how complicated was
the routing to task other MI resources?
How long did it take?
4. What difficulties did the PROPHET
system come up against when operating in
an urban environment?
5. How well did the embedded linguists
work with the Infantry?
SYSTEMS ISSUES 1. What type of systems would have been
more beneficial for this type of
operation?
2. What type of training would have
better prepared our MI Warrants to work
more efficiently?
3. How did equipment such as PROPHET,
UAV, Hunter, Guardrail, TES, CGS, and
Trailblazers operate during this
operation (i.e., deployment efficiency,
actual reporting time, time on target,
etc.)?
4. What urban analytical would have
better served our commanders?
5. If you had a tactical SOP, did you use
it? If you did not have a tactical SOP,
do you think one would have been
beneficial?
The following questions were developed by Concepts, Architecture, and
Requirements (CAR) to assist in the collection facts about the
performance of MI systems and the effectiveness of individual and
collective training of personnel deployed to OIF:
ISSUE: ANALYSIS IS A 1. What was the level of effort directed
CRITICAL COMPONENT OF toward analysis at each tactical
OUR POSTURE FOR THE echelon (Battalion, Brigade, and
OBJECTIVE FORCE; AND Division)?
PART OF THIS EVOLUTION
IS AN UNDERSTANDING 2. How were the results of that analysis
WHERE IT IS BEST made available to the decision makers?
ACCOMPLISHED
3. What were the primary sources of
information that contributed to the
analysis effort by echelon?
ISSUE: THE ROLE OF 1. Were there sufficient tactical
COLLECTION IS RAPIDLY collection assets to meet commanders'
EVOLVING. WE NEED TO needs?
DETERMINE HOW
EFFECTIVE OUR CURRENT 2. Were collect assets sufficiently mobile
COLLECTION ASSETS AND to "keep up" with the maneuver forces?
PROCEDURES ARE (Try to quantify the collection effort in
the 3d ID as it raced across Iraq.)
3. What were the primary external sources
of information and how was the
information from them disseminated to
tactical forces?
ISSUE: INTELLIGENCE 1. What was expected from the S2 at
STAFFS ARE GOING TO BE Battalion, Brigade and Division?
FLATTENED SIGNIFICANTLY
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 2. Were there any critical tasks that
THE UNIT OF ACTION. WE could not be performed? If there were,
NEED TO GET FEEDBACK what were the reasons those could not be
ON WHAT WAS EXPECTED accomplished?
OF STAFFS AND THE
EFFECT OF AUTOMATION 3. What was their primary automation
ON THEIR ABILITY TO support?
PERFORM THEIR JOB
4. Did automation make the tasks
significantly easier to perform?
5. What automation assisted capabilities
would have made the job easier?
6. Were the staffs sized properly with
both numbers and MOS?
ISSUE: LATENCY OF 1. Was latency of intelligence support a
INTELLIGENCE TO significant problem? Situational
COMMANDERS/ LEADERS Awareness? Targeting?
IS A CONSTANT CONCERN.
IT IS ONE WE MUST 2. If latency was an issue, what was
DOCUMENT TO DEVELOP the primary cause? Communications?
THE ABILITY TO OVERCOME Analysis? Processing?
THE TIME DELAY
3. What work-arounds were developed to
overcome this?
IRAQI DENIAL AND 1. What Denial and Deception (D&D) TTPs
DECEPTION (D&D) AAR were used by the Iraqi Army?
(CLASSIFIED SECRET NF
WHEN ANSWERED) 2. Were dummy/decoy fighting positions
used? How were they used in conjunction
with real fighting positions?
3. Was derelict equipment (e.g.,
vehicles, air defense artillery (ADA)
launchers, transporter-erector-launchers
(TELs), etc.) used? If so, by whom?
4. Were low or high fidelity
(multi-spectral) decoys used? If so, what
kind of decoy(s) and who employed them?
How successful were they in fooling our
sensors and/or analysts?
5. Did our analysts have a good
understanding (awareness) on how the
Iraqis would use D&D?
6. Were any high fidelity (multi-spectral)
decoys found that were not used?
What type? Who had them?
7. What type camouflage materials were
used (multi-spectral, other)? Were they
used with decoys? How were they employed?
8. Was communications deception used?
By whom? Was it successful? Did it fool
our communications intelligence (COMINT)
analysts?
9. Was electronic deception (radars)
used? By whom? Was it successful in
fooling our electronic intelligence
(ELINT) analysts?
10. Were our sensors able to discern
real from false (decoys, dummy equipment,
etc.)?
11. Were radar corner reflectors used?
If so, to what purpose?
12. What effect did D&D have on our
forces?
13. What future changes should be
incorporated into our doctrine or
technology to--
[] Identify D&D on the battlefield?
[] Defeat D&D on the battlefield?
In the next edition of MIPB, we will discuss some of these lessons
learned gathered from these, and other, questions. Readers may provide
their input directly to Ms. Cynthia L. Collard (SFC, US Army, Retired)
at Cynthia.collard@ hua.armymil or CW3 Timothy P. McGinty at
timothymcginty@hua.armymil.
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